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Abstract
The paper analyzes the e®ect of di®erent proposals for the new international ¯nan-
cial architecture in an open economy liquidity crises model. It shows that an interna-
tional lender of last resort that provides a complete ¯nancial rescue leads, in the short
run, to a lower probability of a BoP crises and ¯nancial runs. However, the perverse
incentives of a complete bailout lead to an increasing probability of ¯nancial runs in the
long run. A partial ¯nancial package may not reduce the probability of ¯nancial runs
and twin crises. Private sector participation rules can increase the probability of ¯nan-
cial runs and twin crises if a large proportion of foreign investors expect to withdraw
their investment without loss.
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11 Introduction
There is a growing literature in international economics that acknowledges that the recent
currency crises have a large liquidity run component, de¯ned as a situation in which in-
vestors holding short term obligations of the country decide simultaneously to redeem their
assets and °ee the country in amounts that exceed the debtor's available reserves. The fact
that there is a large stock of short run obligations has its roots in the past behavior of the
domestic ¯nancial system which, in moments of distress, also su®ers a run. This leads to
the observed, and recently documented, simultaneous occurrence of balance of payments
(BoP) and banking crises, the so called \twin crises."1
This type of crises seem to have several undesirable characteristics. First, after crisis
countries su®er large real e®ects, one has the impression that the punishments are larger
than the crimes. For example, Korea, Indonesia and Thailand GDPs are expected to shrink
by astonishing {7.0, {8.0 and {15.3 percent (Interim WEO, Dec 1998). These magnitudes
were also observed in previous currency crises as in Chile (1982), Finland (1991), and
Mexico (1995) that shrunk {14.0, {7.1, and {6.9 percent respectively (Dornbush, Goldfajn
and Vald¶ es, 1995). Yet not in all cases the underlying macro fundamentals were weak |or
at least not weak enough to justify the depressions observed. Second, these crises generate
(and possibly also re°ect) an increase in the volatility of capital °ows with its perverse
consequences. Of course, one could argue that the costs of higher volatility per se are not
large but only for the mentioned recessions or \sudden stops" the crises produce.2 Third,
these crises tend to spread to other countries in a phenomenon dubbed \contagion" (Vald¶ es,
1996, and Masson, 1997). The recent contagion from Thailand to the rest of Asia, then to
Russia, and more recently to Latin America has led economists and policy makers to fear
for the stability of the international ¯nancial system.
Several alternatives have been proposed to cope with this alleged threat to the global
¯nancial system. Important economists and policy makers have been advocating the cre-
ation of a global level institutions that could act as an international lender of last resort,
in a parallel to how central banks act in national levels (Sachs, 1995 and Fischer, 1999).
In contrast to central banks, however, the resources of the existing institutions, such as
the IMF, are limited by the size of international claims and potential capital movements.
Another proposal is the introduction of orderly workout rules with creditors, in case of
crisis, that makes it easier to involve (or \bail in") the private sector in the ¯nancial rescue
plans of distressed debtors.
The paper analyzes, theoretically, the e®ect of di®erent proposals for the new interna-
tional ¯nancial architecture in an open economy liquidity model. It evaluates separately
the e®ect of the introduction of an international lender of last resort and the introduction
of orderly workout (or \bail in") rules for the private sector, on the probability of BoP and
banking crises, the degree of ¯nancial intermediation and on capital in°ows. The paper uses
an open economy extension of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs devel-
1The importance of the ratio of short term obligations to reserves has long been stressed by Calvo
(1995). Sachs (1995) has pointed out the importance of the liquidity run component. Goldfajn and Vald¶ es
(1997) and Chang and Velasco (1998) have modelled liquidity runs using the insights from the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) bank run models. Caballero and Krishnamurphy (1998) explain the sudden breakdown of the
country's access to international capital markets with an inadequacy (real or perceived) of its international
collateral. Empirically, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) have documented the large incidence of twin crises.
2As in the famous bankers' adage \it is not the speed that kills, it is the sudden stop."
2oped in Goldfajn and Vald¶ es (1997, 1998). We model ¯nancial intermediaries as channeling
foreign funds towards pro¯table but illiquid domestic investment projects. Intermediaries
o®er short-term deposits which make early withdrawal from an investment less costly for
potentially illiquid foreign investors. Such contracts may attract capital from abroad, but
a tt h es a m et i m et h e ym a k et h ee c o n o m yv u l n e r a b l et ot h er i s ko fr u n sa g a i n s tt h ei n -
termediaries. In particular, for a su±ciently negative productivity shock (or, equivalently,
a large enough world interest-rate shock) bank runs are the unique equilibrium outcome.
BoP crisis are de¯ned as occurring when foreign exchange reserves are smaller than net
capital out°ows, so that the central bank is unable to maintain its currency peg. As in the
case of a banking crisis, if there is a su±ciently large negative shock to net foreign exchange
reserves, then a currency crisis is the unique equilibrium.
The paper shows that under a complete ¯nancial rescue not only BoP crises are avoided
but it is also possible to reduce ¯nancial runs in the short run. However, the perverse
incentives that a complete bailout pose on investors and the ¯nancial system generate an
increasing probability of ¯nancial runs in the long run. If the amount of reserves o®ered
at the pre-devalued exchange rate is positively related to the amount of reserves available
to the central bank, the probability of banking and twin crises may increase with a partial
rescue package. In this case the international organization will only help to bailout foreign
investors. With respect to private sector participation, the model shows that both the
probability of a ¯nancial run and twin crisis increase the larger is the proportion of foreign
investors that expect to withdraw their investment without loss.
Recent papers have analyzed similar issues. Jeanne (1998) ¯nds that orderly workout
rules are unambiguously welfare decreasing while the introduction of a lender of last resort
could be optimal provided it demands tough conditions from the lender. Zettelmeyer (1998)
argues that a partial rescue plan can lead to more investors running in the case of a crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the basic
liquidity model and its solution. Section 3 evaluates the ex-post e®ect on the model of the
di®erent proposals for the international ¯nancial system. Section 4 analyzes and simulates
the ex-ante e®ect of the proposals on capital in°ows, interest rates and the probability of
crises. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Liquidity Model
The model is based on Goldfajn and Vald¶ es (1997, 1998) and is summarized below. Consider
a small open-economy in a three-period world with a continuum of risk-averse international
investors (with mass normalized to 1), who have the option of investing in the small econ-
omy or in a risk-free liquid international asset during period 0. There are two types of
investors with utility function U(~ ct), divided into \early" and \late" consumers, where ~ ct
is consumption in period t (t =1 ;2 depending on the type of investor). U is smooth and
satis¯es U0 > 0a n dU00 < 0. Being an early consumer is an idiosyncratic risk with ¯xed
and known probability µ.
The international asset yields r¤ ¸ 1 per period (measured in terms of international
currency) while the small open economy has a local investment opportunity, based on a
constant-returns-to-scale technology, that needs time to mature. The latter yields a random
return ~ R if the investment is kept in place for two periods (measured in local currency),
but only a ¯xed and known return q<1 if it is interrupted in period 1. ~ R is known only in
3period 1, but it is publicly known that it has a distribution function G(:)w i t hqr¤ · ~ R<R.
Financial intermediaries compete in a free-entry environment by o®ering a contract
that changes the yield pro¯le of the investment in the small open economy. Bertrand
competition ensures that the intermediaries will maximize international investors' expected
utility. Intermediaries pool resources from international investors and invest the proceeds
in the small-economy project. They o®er a return of i to investors who keep the investment
for one period (starting in period 0), possibly higher than the return produced by the
technology q, and they ¯nance this payment by o®ering a return on a two-period investment
lower than ~ R.
The return for investors who stay in for two periods depends on how many investors
withdraw in period 1 and the outcome of ~ R. W ed e n o t eb y~ r2 the return that a late
consumer obtains in period 2 by investing in the small economy (through intermediaries,
if they exist, because they will o®er contracts that maximize investors expected utility). If
early consumers alone liquidate their investment in period 1 (i.e. a proportion µ of total
investors), then:
~ r2 =
(1¡ µi=q) ~ R
1 ¡ µ
: (1)
The timing of moves and events in this economy is summarized as follows. In period
0, intermediaries o®er the short-term return, and investors decide how to allocate their
portfolio. In period 1 both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainties are resolved, early
consumers withdraw, late consumers decide whether to roll-over their investment and the
central bank tries to defend the currency peg. In period 2 late consumers receive ~ r2.
If late consumers decide to withdraw early they will generate a run against the interme-
diaries. In this case, because of their budget constraint, each intermediary would fail to pay
i|there would be a banking crisis|and would have only q to pay to each investor per unit
invested. We assume they would pay this amount to each and every investor withdrawing
their investment. We denote by ~ r1 the return that an early consumer gets in period 1 by
investing in the small economy (through intermediaries, if they exist). Hence, as of period
0, each investor faces the following return structure on an investment in the small economy
(measured in domestic currency):3
~ r1 =
(
i if there is no run, and




~ R(1 ¡ µi=q)=(1¡ µ) if there is no run, and
qr¤ if there is a run.
The central bank attempts to maintain the exchange rate pegged at a rate initially set
equal to 1 and has net reserves amounting to ~ X in period 1, known only in that period due to
current-account shocks. We assume the following behavior by the central bank: if capital
out°ows F in period 1 (determined endogenously by international investors' withdrawal
decisions) are less than ~ X, then the central bank maintains the peg. If out°ows are larger
than the amount of reserves, then the central bank devalues and there is a BoP crisis. In
3We implicitly assume that there is no side-trading in the form of a secondary market.
4this event, however, it sells reserves at the initial exchange rate to a proportion ¯ (¯xed and
known in period 0) of interested agents and at a devalued exchange rate to a proportion
(1 ¡ ¯) of the agents. We assume ~ X has a distribution function F(:) and support (X;X).
We further assume that ~ X and ~ R are independent. With these assumptions, the period 1





1i f F<~ X;
1w i t h p r o b . ¯ if F>~ X,a n d
1+^ e with prob. 1 ¡ ¯ if F>~ X;
(2)
and the period 2 exchange rate e2 is given by maxh1;1+^ ei.^ e is assumed to be large
enough to clear the remaining demand for foreign exchange reserves.
2.1 Model Solution and Probabilities of Crises
There is one reserve constraint given by the amount of reserves available on the central
bank and one incentive compatible constraint associated to the roll-over decision faced by
late consumers in period 1. Once this decision is made one can determine the complete
distribution of returns. Moreover, given realizations of ~ X and ~ R, it is possible to determine
whether there is a run on the intermediary, the amount of capital out°ows in period 1 and,
consequently, the existence of a BoP crisis. Once we have the distribution of returns we
solve the bank's and investors' decisions in period 0. The bank's maximization problem
determines the return i promised in period 1, and the investors' portfolio solution determines
the size of in°ows a in the small open economy.
Di®erent realizations of ~ X and ~ R may trigger any of four possible outcomes: (i) no
crisis, (ii) a BoP crisis, (iii) a banking crisis, or (iv) twin crises (both BoP and banking).
For each type of crisis (BoP and banking) there are two relevant cuto® points or thresholds
for the corresponding random variable. One of the thresholds determines the level at which
there will be one type of crisis (either BoP or banking) independently of the occurrence of
the other type, while the other threshold determines at what point there will be a (BoP or
banking) crisis given the existence of the other one (banking or BoP). These four thresholds
de¯ne the four possible outcomes.
Capital out°ows F de¯ne a threshold for international reserves at which a BoP crisis
exist. Given the initial investment a in the small country (through intermediaries, if they
exist), out°ows F can take two values: aµi and aq. Hence, there is a threshold ^ X for ~ X
associated with each capital out°ow level:
^ X =
(
aµi if there is no bank run, and
aq if there is a bank run
(3)
Of course, if X ¸ aq the probability of BoP crisis is zero.
The occurrence of a banking crisis depends on what happens with the exchange rate and
the outcome of ~ R. The individual roll-over decision assumes that all other late consumers
are rolling-over their investment.4 If no devaluation occurs under \normal" out°ows (i.e. if
4If a late consumer decides to withdraw in this case, then a bank run is the unique equilibrium. Indeed,
if ~ R is low and all other investors run then it is always pro¯table to run. It is possible to consider \sun-spot"
equilibria in the model. However, a variable to coordinate expectations would have to be speci¯ed and its
distribution taken into account in the period-0 portfolio allocation problem.
5F = aµi), then each late consumer compares the two-period return under withdrawal, given
by ir¤, with the two-period return ~ r2 under a no-run situation. This comparison yields a
cuto® ^ R for ~ R that leaves late consumers indi®erent between the two alternative returns,
and de¯nes a banking crisis, given no BoP crisis. The cuto® ^ R is given by:5
^ R =
ir¤ (1 ¡ µ)
1 ¡ iµ=q
: (4)
In the same way we can determine a banking crisis threshold R0 for ~ R if a devaluation
occurs with normal out°ows (that is, if ~ X<a µ i ). In this case, every late consumer
compares his dollar returns from withdrawing and getting exchange rate 1 with probability
¯, or getting the new exchange rate with probability 1 ¡ ¯, against the dollar return from
rolling-over and getting ~ r2 under a no-run situation and the new devalued exchange rate.
The cuto® R0 is implicitly de¯ned by:
U
h
[aR0 (1 ¡ iµ=q)=(1 ¡ µ)]=e2 +(1¡ a)r¤2
i
=
¯U [(ai +(1¡ a)r¤)r¤]+( 1¡ ¯)U [(ai=e2 +( 1¡ a)r¤)r¤];
(5)
where e2 =1+^ e, which is the exchange rate prevailing in period 2. Provided 0 <¯<1,
we have ^ R<R 0.
Given these four thresholds and outcomes, each investor solves his portfolio allocation
problem, taking other investors' portfolios as given. At the same time, because we assumed
that intermediaries engage in Bertrand competition, intermediaries end up choosing i so as
to maximize investors' expected utility. Therefore, one can simultaneously determine the
two endogenous variables, the portfolio allocation, a, and the interest paid by intermediaries
in the ¯rst period, i, by solving the following maximization problem:
maxfa0;igµE[U(~ c1)]+ (1¡ µ)E[U(~ c2)];
with
~ c1 = a0~ r1=~ e1 +( 1¡ a0)r¤
~ c2 = a0~ r2=~ e2 +( 1¡ a0)r¤2;
and where, in equilibrium, the individual portfolio decision a0 must be equal to a,t h e
portfolio chosen by the other agents. ~ c1 and ~ c2 assume di®erent values depending on the
results of ~ X and ~ R and the four possible crisis outcomes.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the areas where BoP, banking and twin crises occur using the
cuto®s de¯ned in equations (3)-(5). From the ¯gure it is straightforward to calculate the
probabilities associated with BoP and banking crises. The results are:
² Unconditional probability of a BoP crisis
Pr(BoP) = G( ^ R)[F(aq) ¡F(aµi)] + F (aµi); (6)
² Unconditional probability of a banking crisis
Pr(Banking) = F (aµi)
h
G(R0) ¡G( ^ R)
i
+ G( ^ R); (7)
5N o t i c e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tG( ^ R) is not the conditional probability of a banking crisis conditional on no BoP
crisis because the events are not independent (even though ~ R and ~ X are).
6² Probability of a twin crisis
Pr(Twin) = G(^ R)[F(aq) ¡F(aµi)] + G(R0)F (aµi): (8)
3 International Financial Structure: Ex-Post Analysis
When analyzing the e®ect of having a lender of last resource and ¯nancial rescue packages
one may distinguish two temporal dimensions, namely the e®ect ex-post and ex-ante of
an international ¯nancial rescue. In our model, an analysis ex-post means investigating
the e®ects on the probability of crises (BoP, banking, or twin) given the decisions on
capital in°ows and interest rates (but before the random productivity and reserve shocks
are realized). In this case, the analysis concentrates on evaluating the e®ect of the di®erent
policies on the incentives given to investors to withdraw in period 1 and on the e®ect the
policy has on the need for the central bank to devalue the currency. A given policy will
possibly change the cuto®s on the exogenous variables, productivity and net reserves, that
determine the probability of the di®erent crises.
3.1 International Lender of Last Resort
What is the e®ect of an international ¯nancial rescue on the probability of crises and capital
in°ows on this small open economy? There are two cases to consider, depending on the
amount of reserves made available to the country: a complete and a partial bailout.
3.1.1 Complete Bailout
In a complete bailout the amount of resources made available for the country is higher
than all possible out°ows (in the model this happens when F = aq · X). Of course, this
possibility seldom occurs in reality since the amount of the ¯nancial package would have to
be prohibitively high. However, it is still important to evaluate this case because it is an
important theoretical benchmark to evaluate policies. In the case of complete bailout we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under a complete bailout the probability of balance of payment crises and twin
crises is zero and the probability of ¯nancial runs decreases.
If the resources available to the country are such that F = aq · X then both F(aq)
and F(aµi) are equal to zero and the probability of BoP crisis in equation (6) collapses to
zero.
The interesting part of the lemma is that not only BoP are prevented but the probability
of ¯nancial runs also fall. If F(aµi) is equal to zero in equation (7) then the probability of
a ¯nancial run is equal to G( ^ R). The latter will be smaller than the probability of ¯nancial
runs without a bailout (with F(aµi) positive) provided R0 ¸ ^ R. This condition is proved
in Goldfajn and Vald¶ es (1998).
It is easy to see the result from Figure 1. If X ¸ aq, the part of the ¯gure before aq
vanishes and the BoP crisis area goes to zero while the ¯nancial run area is just G( ^ R).
73.1.2 Partial Bailout
In a partial bailout the reserves made available to the economy are not su±cient to com-
pletely prevent BoP crises. In the model this means that X increases but we still have
X · aµi · aq · X. If we maintain the assumption that ¯ is constant (which as we will see
below is no longer just a \simpli¯cation"), we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Maintaining the amount of reserves o®ered at the pre-devalued exchange rate
constant, the unconditional probabilities of BoP, banking and twin crisis fall with introduc-
tion of a partial rescue.
From an ex-post point of view, both a and i are given, and the increase in net reserves
available will strictly decrease F(aµi)a n dF(aq)a sl o n ga sX is continuous. For a given ¯,
R0 and ^ R are constant, and one can easily show from equations (6)-(8) that a decrease in
F(aµi)a n dF(aq) reduces the probabilities of BOP, banking and twin crises.6
Therefore, this model provides a result that is not obtained in pure multiple equilibria
models. In the latter, a partial bailout cannot prevent runs (the bad equilibria) and is
interpreted as ine®ective in avoiding crises. This is a consequence of the fact that multiple
equilibria models in general does not provide an endogenously determined probability of
crises. For example, Zettelmeyer (1998) uses a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) structure and
¯nds that a partial bailout can worsen the crises generating more withdrawals from foreign
investors.
However, in general one cannot treat ¯ as a constant. In a more extended model ¯
probably is a positive function of reserves, since the amount of reserves available for the
central bank to defend its currency increases relative to the amount of potential capital
out°ows. This higher ¯ will provide incentives for late consumers to withdraw early and
run against the reserves of the central bank. More formally, if one modi¯es equation (2)
such that ¯ = X=F we have:
Lemma 3 If the amount of reserves o®ered at the pre-devalued exchange rate is positively
related to the amount of reserves available, the probability of ¯nancial runs and twin crises
may increase with the partial bailout.
From equation (5) one can observe that @R0=@¯ > 0. A higher R0, in turn, increases the
probability of ¯nancial runs and twin crises for given level of minimum reserves X (and also
a and i), as can be observed from equations (7) and (8). If this e®ect is strong enough and
compensates the fact that F(aµi)a n dF(aq) decrease, then we would observe an overall
increase in the probability of crises. 7
Intuitively, there are two e®ects to consider. On one hand, the probability of BoP crises
falls since there are more available reserves which generates also more ¯nancial runs. On
the other hand, the incentives to withdraw increase with more reserves available at the old
exchange rate once there is a BoP crises and may generate more ¯nancial runs.
6In the trivial case of aµi · X · aq · X by de¯nition there are no pure BOP crises, only twin crises.
The probability of pure ¯nancial runs will not change with the partial bailout because there are no feedback
e®ects. The probability of twin crises will fall with the decline of F(aq)
7Again, in the trivial case of aµi · X · aq · X the probability of twin crises will also be a®ected by the
change in R
0. The overall e®ect is ambigous has in the general case.
83.2 Private Sector Participation
As seen in section 3.1.1, a complete bailout provides enough reserves to avoid a devaluation
and reduces the probability of a BoP crisis to zero. However, the incentives that a complete
bailout poses may generate higher in°ows than in \normal cases" and, even more, a higher
probability of ¯nancial runs in the long run. This is the moral hazard e®ect that complete
bailouts generate. In order to reduce this problem it has been proposed to let the private
sector su®er a loss in moments of crisis.
An investment loss can be thought of as a discount on the value of the assets that
arises as a consequence of pure unilateral default, discount on withdrawal during debt
renegociations, or the implicit loss following a forced rescheduling.
Let us assume that the involvement of the private sector is a discount in the amount
L ¸ 1 to investors that decide to withdraw out of the country. A complete bailout would
generate enough dollars to avoid a devaluation, but depending on the distribution of the
loss there can still exist incentives to withdraw. The e®ects on capital °ows and on the
probability of crises depend on the distribution of losses among withdrawing investors. A
benchmark case is when the loss is equal to the value of the underlying (implicit) devaluation
L =( 1+^ e) and a proportion ¯ of the runners is able to withdraw their investment without
loss. In this case, the probability of crises and the amount of capital in°ows are the same
as if there was no bailout and no loss. The only di®erence is that there is no devaluation
and part of the reserve losses is ¯nanced by the rescue package in case of loss.
However, if the tax distribution is, say, Á · ¯, the probability of \BoP crises" is higher
under this scheme. The reason is that the cuto® R0 changes from (5) to:
U
h
[aR0=L(1¡ iµ=q)=(1 ¡ µ)]=e2 +( 1¡ a)r¤2
i
=
ÁU [(ai +(1¡ a)r¤)r¤]+( 1¡ Á)U [(ai=L +( 1¡ a)r¤)r¤];
(9)
where L is the discount applied to holders of assets in the small open economy. Provided
Á · ¯, R0 is lower in this case and the probability of BoP crisis decreases.
In reality the probable \losers" from a devaluation are not the same that from a coor-
dinated restructuring of the debt. Depending on the composition of "losers" we may have
di®erent e®ects on capital °ows and crises.
Lemma 4 Under a rescue package with private sector participation, the probability of ¯-
nancial runs and twin crises increases the larger is the proportion Á of the runners that is
able to withdraw their investment without loss.
If the loss is structured in such a way that there is a larger Á, then there is a higher
probability of runs although there is no devaluation|it will be the typical case which the
international organization is funding dollars so that foreign investors are able to leave the
country. In contrast, if the loss is imposed to every investor that decides to withdraw, i.e.,
the government is able to make Á =0 ,t h e nR0 equals ^ R and there are less ¯nancial runs
and no twin crises.
4 International Financial Structure: Ex-ante Analysis
An important component of the exercise is to identify the general equilibrium e®ect of
the policy once capital in°ows and interest rates are allowed to react to policies. In this
9Table 1. Baseline Simulation Parameters
Description Parameter Value
Relative risk aversion ° 3.00
Maximum domestic return R 1.80
Interrupted return q 0.85
International interest rate r¤ 1.04
Probability of mass return ¼ 0.65
Proportion of early consumers µ 0.20
Reserves lower bound X 0.00
Reserves upper bound X 1.40
Proportion who gets e =1 ¯ 0.25
BoP crisis exchange rate 1+ ^ e 1.05
See text for further description.
section we present a simulation exercise that allows us to numerically analyze the e®ects of
alternative policies.
Numerical Simulations Given that there are no closed-form solutions in our model, we
resort to numerical simulations to analyze the overall e®ects on probabilities, intermediation
and capital in°ows of alternative rescue packages and capital controls. In those simulations
we consider the following baseline numerical example of the model presented above. Given
that the model is highly stylized and abstract, this example should be taken exclusively as
such.
We assume that the two-period return of the emerging economy technology R has a
mixed distribution with mass at r¤2.I np a r t i c u l a r ,R = r¤2 with probability ¼,a n dR has
a uniform distribution with support in (qr¤;R) with probability 1 ¡ ¼. As for period 1
available international reserves X, we assume that they have a uniform distribution with
bounds given by (X;X).8 International investors have a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function with parameter °. Table 1 summarizes the speci¯c parameter
values we consider in the baseline simulation.
Table 2 shows the results after assuming the model structure described above and these
parameter values.9 It shows that in equilibrium there is positive intermediation (i>q ).
More importantly, while the probabilities of BoP, ¯nancial and twin crisis all increase with
intermediation, capital in°ows also increase. In particular, the probabilities of BoP only,
banking and twin crisis increase from 3.14, 0.00, and 0.01% to 4.25, 4.52, and 1.15%,
respectively. Meanwhile, in°ows increase from 0.26 to 0.33.
8Notice that in the model it is irrelevant how large are international reserves after the aq bound has been
reached because the exchange rate will not change. The only e®ect of a larger X is to change the probability
of a BoP crisis.
9The routine we use to ¯nd the optimal solution has three phases. Given i and a (the portfolio chosen by
other agents) and implicit state-probabilities, it searches for the optimal a
0 (the agent's optimal portfolio).
It then updates a to this new solution and repeats the search of the optimal a
0, iterating until convergence.
Finally, it searches for the optimal i given the optimal a chosen for each i.
10Table 2. Baseline Simulation Solution
Description Variable Value
No Intermediation
Capital In°ow an 0.26
Probability of BoP crisis only 3.14
Probability of ¯nancial crisis only 0.00
Probability of twin crisis 0.01
Free Intermediation
Capital In°ow ai 0.33
Intermediation o®ered i 0.96
Probability of BoP crisis only 4.25
Probability of ¯nancial crisis only 4.52
Probability of twin crisis 1.15
See text for further description.
4.1 Financial Packages and Private Sector Involvement
What is the ex-ante e®ect of a future bailout on capital in°ows? Intuitively, capital in°ows
should increase due to a lower probability of both crises. Moreover, the increased level of
available net reserves reduces the probability of ¯nancial runs and allows for more °attening
in the yield curve. This, in turn, may attract further capital in°ows. However, this extra
intermediation dampens the initial e®ect of higher reserves on the probability of ¯nancial
runs.
Foreign investors are better o® due to a lower probability of crises and a more °atten
yield curve (a net liquidity gain). However, because short-term interest rates increase
beyond what their \normal" level, the probability of ¯nancial runs increases, dampening
the initial bene¯ts of higher reserves on the probability of crises. This e®ect is in line with
the typical trade-o® highlighted in the literature of large bailouts that rescue distressed
economies but induce moral hazard behavior by the part of investors.
Figure 2 shows the results of a simulation exercise in which we consider ¯nancial bailouts
of di®erent sizes. The most immediate result, as expected, is that the probability of a BoP
crisis falls to zero as the size of the package increases. More interestingly, ¯nancial runs
decrease in the short run as the incentives to run decrease. However, as the size of the
package increases, liquidity is easy, capital in°ows become very large, and the probability
of ¯nancial runs increases steeply. Once the probability of ¯nancial runs are higher, capital
in°ows level up.
Figure 3 shows the same exercise but allowing the proportion of reserves to defend the
currency, ¯, to depend on reserves. In this case, although the probability of a BoP crisis
decreases rapidly, the probability of ¯nancial runs increases steadily. The reason is that,
even for low values of ¯nancial assistance, withdrawals are expected to be more rewarding
measured in foreign currency.
Finally, ¯gure 4 shows the results of an exercise using a rule in which there is private
sector participation. In particular, investors have to pay a penalty L in case of exit. The
11probability of ¯nancial runs initially increases, the more so the less universal is the penalty.
However, at some very high level of non forced participation, liquidity o®ered by ¯nancial
institutions decreases and, accordingly, the probability of ¯nancial runs falls.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The paper hints on a few policy implications. First, paradoxically, partial rescues should
not be used to defend currencies in the case of ¯nancial runs. Otherwise, the rescue package
could be providing incentives to withdrawals and ¯nancial runs. The additional reserves
provided by the package should rather be used to smooth other external shocks. Alterna-
tively, to prevent perverse incentives, international rescues should be complete, i.e., covering
all possible out°ows. In this case, the customary moral hazard problems arise.
Second, private sector participation rules should be as universal as possible. Partial
rules and loopholes that allow individual investors to °ee provide incentives that increase
the probability of crises.
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14Figure 1: Period 1 Outcomes
15Figure 2: Capital Flows and Crises under a Financial Rescue
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